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A truly one-of-a-kind intelligence analysis cell, solely focused on intelligence analysis in support of PR operations, exists in the Joint Intelligence Center at Headquarters, Central Command. No other United States Combatant Command has this unique capability or experience. It is in the best interest of the United States military to remedy this deficiency across the combatant command spectrum, starting with Pacific Command (USPACOM). USPACOM should establish a dedicated personnel recovery intelligence analysis cell to support combat search and rescue and hostage-taking contingencies.			
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**INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO PERSONNEL RECOVERY:
IS USPACOM READY FOR THE UNEXPECTED?**

By

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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CONTENTS

Introduction	1
Personnel Recovery Environment	3
Intelligence Support to PR	5
Personnel Recovery Operations in CENTCOM AOR	6
Personnel Recovery Operations in PACOM AOR	9
Challenges in PACOM PR	11
Value of a PACOM PR Intelligence Cell	12
Recommendations	14
Conclusion	16
Notes	17
Bibliography	19
Appendix I	20
Appendix II	22
Appendix III	24
Appendix IV	29

ABSTRACT

The United States military is highly-trained and adequately-equipped for conventional personnel recovery operations. However, insurgent groups and adversaries of the United States all over the world use a variety of asymmetric approaches to degrade or negate the military dominance of friendly forces. Kidnapping operations are an example of this type of asymmetric approach. Kidnapping changes a normal operations-centric personnel recovery event into an intelligence-centric effort. Kidnapping operations are one of the few tactical events which can produce highly-detrimental strategic consequences for national-level political and military decision-makers. The United States, especially at the Combatant Commander level, is ill-equipped for this type of mission.

A truly one-of-a-kind intelligence analysis cell, solely focused on intelligence analysis in support of PR operations, exists in the Joint Intelligence Center at Headquarters, Central Command. No other United States Combatant Command has this unique capability or experience. It is in the best interest of the United States military to remedy this deficiency across the combatant command spectrum, starting with Pacific Command (USPACOM). USPACOM should establish a dedicated personnel recovery intelligence analysis cell to support combat search and rescue and hostage-taking contingencies.

Intelligence Support to Personnel Recovery: Is USPACOM ready for the unexpected?

INTRODUCTION

“Intelligence is the life of everything in war.”

Letter, General Nathanael Greene to

Major John Clark

November 5, 1777¹

On 09 April 2004, U.S. Army Staff Sergeant Keith Maupin was abducted by Al-Qai'da in Iraq (AQI) operatives after his supply convoy came under attack in the vicinity of Abu Ghuraib, Iraq. AQI then used SSGT Maupin to publicly promote their extremist ideology and political demands via videotape broadcasts on international television and the Internet. SSGT Maupin was ultimately killed. It took just over four years to locate and recover his remains.²

On 07 January 2006, Jill Carroll, an American freelance journalist from *The Christian Science Monitor*, was abducted by militant insurgents operating in Baghdad, Iraq. Ms. Carroll was repeatedly moved from one location to another all over Iraq. On numerous occasions she was videotaped and directed to dictate political demands to the United States government and the international community. Jill Carroll was later released unharmed by her captors after approximately three months in captivity.³

The United States military is highly-trained and adequately-equipped for what is referred to as “traditional or conventional personnel recovery (PR)” also known as combat search and rescue (CSAR). CSAR generally involves a downed pilot or an isolated Soldier or Marine on the battlefield. The United States military is well-versed in this type of recovery operation. However, adversaries of the United States and her coalition partners “are likely to use asymmetric approaches as a method of degrading or negating support for military operations or the military dominance of friendly forces”.⁴

The following two examples from operations in Iraq illustrate one asymmetric approach favored by adversaries of the United States and her coalition partners is kidnapping and ransom.

Kidnapping activities by militant groups present the United States military with a truly unique operational conundrum and quickly change a normally operations-centric CSAR operation into an intelligence-centric analysis problem. According to the Director of the Consolidated Personnel Recovery Center, Afghanistan, LCDR Patrick Wiegleb, “a targeted kidnapping is a more significant threat than an aircraft or conventional force-related event”.⁵ Kidnapping operations are one of the few tactical events which can produce highly-detrimental strategic consequences for national-level political and military decision-makers. Whether supporting a conventional PR operation or a hostage-taking scenario, PR operations rely heavily on intelligence analysis to locate the isolated person. That intelligence effort focuses solely on recovering the victim – dead or alive.⁶

All PR intelligence analysis production is dedicated toward successfully locating and recovering any missing or isolated person within a given AOR. The two kidnapping scenarios from Iraq described above, and many more like them, were ultimately resolved thanks to the dedicated intelligence analysis efforts of the Personnel Recovery Intelligence Analysis Cell within the Joint Intelligence Center, United States Central Command (JICCENT), located at MacDill AFB, Tampa, Florida. A truly one-of-a-kind intelligence analysis cell, this team is solely focused on intelligence analysis in support of PR operations in the United States Central Command’s (USCENTCOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR). No other United States Combatant Command has this unique capability or experience. It is in the best interest of the United States military to remedy

this deficiency across the combatant command spectrum, starting with United States Pacific Command (USPACOM). USPACOM should establish a dedicated personnel recovery intelligence analysis cell to support combat search and rescue and hostage-taking contingencies.

PERSONNEL RECOVERY ENVIRONMENT

A conventional CSAR operation “focuses on the downed pilot or isolated Soldier or Marine, who, although isolated, retains two vital abilities: to ‘self-locate’ (communicate) and general freedom of movement (evasion). However, the kidnapping victim is immediately deprived of both of these abilities. The victim’s communications and movements are dictated by the hostage-takers.”⁷ Personnel recovery operations cases such as SSGT Maupin or Jill Carroll offer a very unique operating environment for all persons involved. “Personnel recovery, particularly hostage-taking scenarios, blends a unique intelligence analysis challenge with a dynamic political and environmental atmosphere.”⁸

PR is interlaced with political nuances which the intelligence analyst must heed and work with. For the United States, PR works under an established hierarchy of “designated persons” – persons that, if isolated, would warrant immediate reshuffling of strategic, operational, and tactical military assets and operations. U.S. armed forces personnel top the list. This is followed by U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) personnel and U.S. citizens. Next come coalition armed forces and/or civilians, followed by non-coalition, foreign personnel. As LCDR Wiegleb explains, “people falling outside this definition can be declared to be Persons of Interest (POI)... at the request of the isolated person’s Embassy.”⁹ POI designation may happen simply because the United States

possesses the highest number of and most capable rescue assets. As is readily apparent, where the isolated person falls within this hierarchy dictates the necessary political and diplomatic cooperation that needs to take place. This political atmosphere may affect not only PR operations but also information sharing between the affected agency or foreign government and the United States.¹⁰

When dealing with an isolated person of a foreign country, there are more political factors to consider: Will the affected government request assistance from the United States, specifically the DOD? Will the affected government's embassy or consulate and/or intelligence apparatus share valuable and timely information to United States operations and intelligence personnel? What modes of communication need to be in place to enhance a rescue operation? What information on this incident will be shared with the public? How will the PR operation take place? When will the operation take place? Will the United States be allowed to conduct unilateral rescue operations or will forces/representatives from the affected government be present during the operation?¹¹

To further complicate matters, the human element of PR can create a myriad of political issues on the domestic front. The victim of the kidnapping is alone, without friends or family and has no way to communicate with the outside world. Military operations have been delayed, cancelled, and rescheduled; assets have been diverted, affecting thousands of military personnel across the theater. Meanwhile, the victim's family and loved ones are heart-broken, angry, shocked, and often demanding answers from either the United States armed forces or the United States government on a continuous basis.¹² Dominic Tierney, author of a January 2010 *Journal of World Affairs* article entitled "Prisoner Dilemmas: The American Obsession with POWs and Hostages"

explains, “the incarceration of Americans by foreign actors has incredible emotional and political power, and often garners profound media scrutiny.”¹³ The taxing emotional and political investment Americans place toward a kidnapped victim is one of the reasons insurgent groups engage in this type of tactic.

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO PR

There are many reasons insurgent groups engage in kidnapping: revenue generation via ransoms, political propaganda against an international government or entity, intimidation of local citizens, or as a means of discrediting the local government in the eyes of its populace. Kidnapping are believed to account for hundreds of millions of dollars in annual revenue. A great proportion of this money is directly used to fund future insurgent operations.¹⁴

The key to a successful recovery is locating the victim as soon as possible after their isolation. Intelligence support to PR is initiated and sustained by a proactive, robust focus on joint intelligence preparation of the operating environment (JIPOE). JIPOE provides a specific geographical area in which PR intelligence analysts can proactively focus collection assets and enhance offensive operations – supporting both the rescue of an isolated person(s) and the targeting of hostage-taking groups and individuals. The critical factor in the JIPOE methodology is identifying the hostage-takers’ tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP). Over the period of their incarcerations, hostages are generally moved to many different locations where they are held for varying amounts of time – constantly guarded, frequently bound and blindfolded, ruthlessly interrogated, and occasionally tortured. Understanding when, where, and how the hostage-takers select, abduct, hold, move and sustain a hostage can prove vital in efficiently and effectively

extrapolating valid location possibilities from the intelligence fusion effort, ultimately finding the hostage, and repatriating them with honor and dignity. JIPOE assists in identifying the hostage-takers’ “pockets of sanctuary” – geographical areas of interest which provide the hostage-takers the logistics and security networks necessary to move, hold and sustain a hostage. These pockets are identified by overlaying a set of criteria established by conducting trend analysis of historical kidnapping cases.¹⁵

Once these pockets of sanctuary, and the facilities and personalities within them, are identified, the intelligence analyst can then validate message traffic regarding the hostage or hostage-taking groups and better focus follow-on collections within that geographic area. Thus, by gathering intelligence on not only the hostage but also the hostage-takers, PR JIPOE eventually evolves into a personality-based targeting methodology which results in the kill or capture of those individuals or groups responsible for the kidnappings.¹⁶

The end result of PR-focused JIPOE analysis is a collection of intelligence products consisting of multiple overlays such as regional and local demographics, enemy population support centers, movement trends, infrastructure nodal analysis, personality-based link diagrams, etc. All of these products are primarily designed to locate the hostage(s) but can also be used in multiple operational products in support of other missions.

PERSONNEL RECOVERY OPERATIONS IN CENTCOM AOR

To understand why USPACOM should have an intelligence analysis cell dedicated for PR, it is best to describe how the intelligence analysis cell at USCENTCOM evolved and highlight the value which that cell provided. As a result of

Operations ENDURING and IRAQI FREEDOM and on-going operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, USCENTCOM has experienced the greatest number and variety of personnel recovery events of any combatant command. Therefore, the USCENTCOM PR operational architecture is firmly in place, well-manned and well-equipped. That architecture is led by the USCENTCOM Joint Personnel Recovery Center (JPRC) located in Al-Udied, Qatar. In the event of a PR event anywhere in the USCENTCOM AOR, the JPRC coordinates and directs all personnel recovery assets and efforts to recover the isolated person(s). This includes not only synchronizing assets and personnel in the geographical vicinity of the PR event but also coordinating with national agencies located in the United States.

The JPRC is assisted in these efforts by subordinate regional Personnel Recovery Coordination Centers (PRCC) such as the Consolidated PRCC in Afghanistan which, according to its Director, LCDR Wieglob, “combines the US Forces Afghanistan PRCC with the ISAF Combat Rescue Coordination Center under one roof”.¹⁷ The Consolidated PRCC supervises the further subordinate regional Rescue Coordination Centers (RCC) in six ISAF Regional Commands, “giving the battlespace owner access to any national or theater assets they need in order to action the event.”¹⁸

The PRCCs in both Iraq and Afghanistan are supported locally by a small group of dedicated PR intelligence analysts. Members of this analytical team are drawn from many different intelligence agencies including the USCENTCOM PR Intelligence Analysis Cell from USCENTCOM HQ in Tampa. As mentioned previously, this type of robust intelligence support is highly unique in the PR arena – a highly-valuable

intelligence structure which originated with and grew from the extensive efforts to locate and recover U.S. Army SSGT Keith Maupin in 2004.

SSGT Maupin's unfortunate and unexpected abduction quickly introduced USCENTCOM to the colossal political nightmare that a PR event can generate. Author Dominic Tierney explains that "the issue of captive Americans is like dynamite: it's potentially explosive but needs a spark to detonate in the public mind – with the ignition usually provided by media or elite coverage."¹⁹ Al-Jazeera broadcasts of AQI-produced videos of SSGT Maupin in captivity instantly implanted awareness and concern among the American people and amplified the public pressure and expectations on United States political and military leaders to resolve the situation. According to Mr. Tierney, "once the connection is drawn between the prisoners' plight and the perception that the United States is being held hostage and humiliated, the crisis takes on critical reputational implications."²⁰

As time passed and the case went unresolved, SSGT Maupin's parents became increasingly frustrated with national government and military officials and the seeming lack of concern and effort being expended in locating and rescuing their son. The Maupins increased the pressure by communicating and coordinating with the family of United States Navy Captain Scott Speicher, a F/A-18 pilot who was shot down on the first night of Operation DESERT STORM in 1991 and whose body had still not been recovered by the United States.

By this point in time, the Speicher family represented a formidable political force in the world of PR. The on-going efforts to locate CAPT Speicher were being led by intelligence analysts at the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) POW-MIA Analysis Cell.

The collective political expectations of a resolution to the Speicher case had grown so much that the DIA POW-MIA Analysis Cell was required to provide a Congressional committee a bi-annual update on all efforts to locate and recover CAPT Speicher's remains.

USCENTCOM responded to this series of events by establishing an intelligence analysis cell dedicated to locating both SSGT Maupin and CAPT Speicher. As time passed and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM continued, additional PR events occurred within the AOR, increasing the need for long-term intelligence analysis dedicated to finding missing persons in Iraq. Efforts were then made to forward deploy this analytical capability to the PRCC located at the United States Embassy in Baghdad. The first PR intelligence analysis cell, consisting of intelligence analysts from USCENTCOM, DIA POW-MIA Analysis Cell, and the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency (JPRA), was established in March 2006. Additional efforts were made to improve the effectiveness of this fledgling enterprise by incorporating liaisons and analysts from the interagency community, namely the FBI, CIA, Department of State, and even DEA. This holistic approach to intelligence support to PR has now grown to include full-time PR intelligence analytical capabilities in both Iraq and Afghanistan.

PERSONNEL RECOVERY OPERATIONS IN PACOM AOR

Fortunately the kidnapping of a United States citizen or Westerner does not occur frequently in the USPACOM AOR, but many insurgents groups in the USPACOM AOR utilize kidnapping as a tactic. An example of such an event is the 27 May 2001, abduction of American citizens Martin and Gracia Burnham. The couple was abducted from the Dos Palmas Resort, a tropical paradise retreat located in Honda Bay, northeast

of Puerto Princesa, the capital of Palawan, Philippines. The Burnhams, American missionaries serving in the Philippines, were celebrating their eighteenth wedding anniversary at the resort. They were abducted in the middle of the night, along with other hostages of different nationalities, by the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), a militant group of Muslim extremists operating in and around the Philippine Islands. Martin and Gracia were held by the ASG for over a year. On the day of their rescue operation conducted by operatives from the Philippine military while under U.S military advisement, Martin was killed in the ensuing firefight. Gracia was shot and injured but was ultimately rescued.²¹

LCDR Wiegleb of the Consolidated PRCC in Afghanistan states, “If I were a PR officer in [US]PACOM, I would be concerned about hostage-taking as one of my top priorities. There are no active combat operations but there is a relatively heavy U.S. footprint in the region, creating a target-rich environment for anyone wanting to kidnap [US]PACOM personnel.”²² According to recent reports, that footprint is going to grow in the near future as the Obama Administration and the Pentagon shifts their focus from Iraq and Afghanistan to Asia, specifically the Southeast Asia region.²³ As the number of United States military members in the region grows, so does the number of family members, support elements, non-governmental organizations, and representation from a multitude of United States government agencies and private enterprises. As the number of Americans in the region increases, so do the chances that one or more of them will be kidnapped by one the active insurgent groups, further ripening the environment for a catastrophic occurrence and a major problem for the United States. The Burnham’s’ case provides a great example of this type of incident. The Burnhams were taken hostage and then moved by motorboat from Palawan Island to Mindanao. Given the geography of the

region, this type of movement would be very difficult to track, making the kidnapping victim(s) very difficult to find.²⁴ If USPACOM is not fully prepared and proactive with their intelligence planning and support toward personnel recovery, particularly kidnapping scenarios, USPACOM could quickly find itself under the same negative political and public scrutiny experienced by USCENTCOM in the Maupin and Speicher cases described above.

CHALLENGES IN PACOM PR

In spite of a relatively low number of incidents compared to USCENTCOM, there is a persistent risk of a catastrophic PR event within USPACOM. A worst-case scenario for USPACOM is described as a long-term, multiple-hostage kidnapping event in an area such as Indonesia or the southern Philippines where Islamist extremists have shown they will not hesitate to kill hostages.²⁵ In spite of these risks and factual precedents, historically PR as a global mission area does not get sustained priority until an event actually happens, at which time the system is playing catch up in a game where prevention, proactive protocols, and rapid reporting are the most effective measures. As USPACOM PR Director, Dr. Jerald Ogrisseg, Ph.D. states, “There are a lot of countries and a lot of water. I worry about anyone sent forward who hasn’t planned, prepared, and equipped their folks to report themselves as isolated or missing and to provide a location as soon as possible to set the PR process in motion.”²⁶ There is a large challenge to convince commands to invest in low probability incidents regardless of the impact in a resource-constrained environment. This results in deficits in staffing and funding to ensure that personnel are prepared.

Although USPACOM does have JPRCs and PRCCs in certain countries, the joint assets in place are limited relative to the size of the AOR. This adds to the challenge of USPACOM's PR space-time-force equation, particularly in a hostage scenario. Additionally, as this paper directly addresses, USPACOM does not have a dedicated intelligence analysis cell for PR. Intelligence support for PR is decentralized and comes from a variety of entities and agencies, driven in part by personal relationships which have been developed over the years.²⁷

These limiting factors collectively render the USPACOM PR architecture highly dependent upon interagency community assets within the AOR. LCDR Wieglob visualizes this relationship for USPACOM. "In [US]PACOM, I'd be relying very heavily on those interagency capabilities... working through the host nation to effect recovery... since we don't have the same military freedom of action or authorities there that we have in Afghanistan. Most of our intelligence information and possibly contacts to the captors would come from other agencies."²⁸ Some analysts, such as DIA POW-MIA Cell's Senior USPACOM Intelligence Analyst, Joseph Miles, view this type of interagency cooperation as a major strength of the current USPACOM PR architecture. "Positive cooperation within the interagency is not a problem. Interagency assets may be scattered around the theater, but mechanisms are in place to ensure cooperation between interagency players."²⁹ Nonetheless, this still requires adequate staffing and the human element to bridge these connections together.

VALUE OF A PACOM PR INTELLIGENCE CELL

Some would argue that USPACOM experiences too few PR events, even hostage-taking events, to justify a full-time PR intelligence effort. Unfortunately for USPACOM

the use of kidnapping by insurgent movements is not going away anytime soon and the threat is a major concern to those who support PR operations within USPACOM.

Insurgent groups such as the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), Jama'ah Islamiya (JI), Jama'ah Anshurat Tauhid (JAT), Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), Dawood Ibrahim Group, and transnational threats such as Taliban-Al-Qa'ida pose significant threats to U.S military and civilians operating, living, or even vacationing in the region.³⁰ ³¹ LCDR Wiegleb explains,

Granted, the likelihood [of a PR event] might be low, but the strategic effects of a hostage taking are potentially very high. People sometimes say, ‘What will those people [PR intelligence analysts] do when there is not an event going on?’ What they can do between active events is study historic events, learn kidnapping networks and TTPs, identify likely kidnap/hostage facilitators, help with establishing NAR [non-conventional recovery], build liaison with other services, etc. There’s no shortage of work for the cell. That goes for whether there is a war on or not - the Defense Attaché Officer (DAO) in the Philippines could get kidnapped tomorrow.³²

Others would argue the PR architecture and system currently in place in USPACOM is adequate enough for the current threat situation and low number of incidents. Again however, those who support PR operations within USPACOM, would argue the current system is inadequate, underfunded, and highly reactionary, especially for a long-term, multiple hostage scenario. Joe Miles from DIA POW-MIA Cell explains, “If money is not an issue, I could preposition assets at key locations in theater and would be ready for any contingency. [However] since money and resources are an issue, I believe that I am in a position where I will simply react to the situation and go from there.”³³

All of this adds up to significant risk for the USPACOM commander because responsibility for the hostages ultimately lies with the President of the United States. Dominic Tierney explains, “Driven by a combination of idealism, wrath, and concerns over reputation, the status of captive Americans can become a national obsession” and carries “incredible emotional and political power... Our intense fascination with POWs and hostages can nevertheless prove dangerous for American interests and values... Presidents can obsess about the fate of captives to the exclusion of other important issues, sucking the oxygen out of the political atmosphere”.³⁴ As illustrated, the risk posed by a catastrophic PR event may be too high for any combatant commander to handle; however, proactive measures can be taken which can significantly reduce those risks.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- **Change PR doctrine to include an emphasis on hostage-taking scenarios and the need for intelligence support.** LCDR Wiegleb sums up this deficiency. “One problem I see in the PR community is that many of the community leaders and doctrine-writers have a Vietnam/Cold War Air Force mindset... centered around CSAR... Kidnappings are a completely different concern.”³⁵
- **Include PR as one of the USPACOM Commander’s Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR).** This ensures a holistic intelligence collection and analytical approach is taken toward the problem and provides the USPACOM Commander an extra layer of credibility in the face of a possible political firestorm resulting from a major PR event.
- **Increase the manpower and resources dedicated to USPACOM JPRCs and PRCCs.** Dr. Ogrisseg, the USPACOM JPRC Director, states his needs clearly.

“We need more staff at the OPR shop, at the JPRC, and dedicated intelligence assistance. With these, I’d have more time and resources to liaison and network with interagency personnel with connections at the country team level.”³⁶ These regional JPRCs and PRCCs should be organized and ready to receive and support a team of intelligence analysts in the event of a PR event within their respective region.

- **Establish a dedicated PR intelligence analysis cell within the Joint Operations and Intelligence Center, Pacific (JIOCPAC).** This cell should be manned by 5-10 civilian all-source intelligence analysts, including a full-time collections manager, and be led by a military, 0-4-level intelligence officer. All intelligence analysts should undergo specific PR training through the Joint Personnel Recovery Agency’s (JPRA) Personnel Recovery Education and Training Center (PRETC). The cell should also include representation from, or direct and regular liaison with, SOCPAC and intelligence community (IC) agencies such as DIA, FBI, CIA, DOS, DEA, etc. This analytical cell should be organized to provide and support an intelligence “fly-away” team to any regional JPRC or PRCC that is dealing with a PR event in their operating area.
- **Ensure all Memorandums of Agreement (MoA) and Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA) between all interagency players and regional countries address PR authorities, responsibilities, and intelligence sharing.** The United States needs to ensure PR-related topics and intelligence sharing become and remain a major discussion point during participation in numerous multilateral opportunities within the USPACOM region such as the Five Power Defense

Arrangements (FPDA), Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS), and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).³⁷

CONCLUSION

USPACOM, and other combatant commands outside of USCENTCOM, assume a great amount of risk by grouping all PR events as CSAR operations and turning a blind eye toward the dangerous realities of kidnapping operations by various insurgent groups. The kidnapping of an American or group of Americans can happen at any time, in any place. In the age of global multimedia and growing international scrutiny, the United States cannot afford to let a single kidnapping event negatively affect her national security or economic strategic goals, especially in such an important geographical and political region as the USPACOM AOR. The establishment of a dedicated PR intelligence analysis cell within the USPACOM JIOC would greatly minimize these risks by giving the USPACOM Commander and the President of the United States a viable and tangible asset to prove to the American people and the international community that locating and rescuing Americans is a top priority and kidnapping activities by regional insurgent groups will not be tolerated. LCDR Wieglob fully captures the changes in intelligence support to PR that need to happen across the combatant command spectrum. “Having an intelligence analysis/fusion capability specifically dedicated to PR is very helpful... I definitely think each COCOM should have a dedicated PR intelligence team.”³⁸

NOTES

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- ¹⁵ Ibid.
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- ²⁸ Patrick W. Wiegleb. e-mail message to author, 07 March 2011.
- ²⁹ Joseph Miles. e-mail message to author, 25 February 2011.
- ³⁰ B. Raman. "Dawood Ibrahim: The Global Terrorist." *South Asia Analysis Group*. <http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers9/paper818.html> (accessed 30 April 2011).

³¹ Crisis Group, “Indonesia: The Dark Side of Jama’ah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT).” *Crisis Group*. <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-east-asia/indonesia/B107-indonesia-the-dark-side-of-jamaah-ansharut-tauhid-jat.aspx> (accessed 30 April 2011).

³² Patrick W. Wiegleb. Director, Consolidated Personnel Recovery Center Afghanistan, e-mail message to author, 12 March 2011.

³³ Joseph Miles. e-mail message to author, 25 February 2011.

³⁴ Dominic Tierney, *Journal of World Affairs* 54, no. 1 (January 2010): 130, 138.

³⁵ Patrick W. Wiegleb. e-mail message to author, 07 March 2011.

³⁶ Jerald F. Ogrisseg. e-mail message to author, 28 February 2011.

³⁷ Anonymous, “Naval Diplomacy – Broadening Regional Co-operation and Beyond.” *Naval Forces* 28 (2007): 30.

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APPENDIX I

Transcript: Joseph Miles. Senior PACOM Intelligence Analyst, Defense Intelligence Agency POW-MIA Cell, e-mail message to author, 25 February 2011.

Fu,

Hope this works for you. Let me know if you need additional information.

/r,

Joe

1. Is there a dedicated intelligence analysis cell for PR at PACOM/JICPAC?

A: No. PACOM, specifically SOCPAC, relies on DIA POW/MIA Cell as primary intelligence source; JICPAC secondary. I would not say that SOCPAC specifically relies on us, but historically we have answered their RFIs. I believe this is driven in part by personal relationships we (the Cell) have developed over the years.

2. Is hostage-taking a concern in the PACOM AOR? Where? By whom?

A: PACOM experiences a low amount of hostage-related cases. The last "big-ticket" event was the Burnhams case on 27 May, 2001. (You mentioned a case in 2005?). Of greatest concern is the Philippines and ASG. I misspoke about 2005. Two "big-ticket" kidnappings; ASG kidnapping three ICRC members in Jan 2009 and two Chinese Malaysians kidnapped by the ASG in Feb 2010. Both kidnappings ended after substantial ransoms were paid.

2a. What would you consider a worst-case scenario?

A: A long-term, possible multiple-hostage case like experienced in CENTCOM, especially in an area such as Indonesia or the Philippines. Would attempts be made to centralize all operational and intelligence efforts from Hawaii or would an ops-intel element be sent forward? Worst case in my opinion would be in the southern Philippines where Islamic extremists have shown they will not hesitate to kill hostages in the event things go south. Plus, running a rescue cell from Hawaii would be a nightmare in my opinion, but it could be done in necessary.

3. How do you deal with the scale of the geographic area?

A: The Coast Guard has the greatest amount of assets in theater for conventional PR/CSAR. The Navy will use assets if they have them available. PR operations are done on a reactionary basis and everything is handled from Hawaii. There are no forward-deployed PR intelligence analysis cells (or PRDs?) like in Iraq and Afghanistan. Agree completely. You hit the nail on the head, at this point in time, excluding Japan or Korea, any KFR or hostage event would (in my opinion) initially be handled from Hawaii until a decision was made to move assets forward.

4. How do you scope the mission? Who are you responsible for?

A: Same as CENTCOM - U.S. military personnel, U.S. DOD personnel, U.S. citizens, Coalition armed forces and/or civilians, or whoever is deemed "important" by DoS and diplomatic channels. Agree.

5. How dependent are you/would you be on interagency cooperation? FBI, CIA, DoS, etc.?

A: Positive cooperation within interagency is not a problem. Interagency assets may be scattered around theater, but mechanisms are in place to ensure cooperation between interagency players. Agree.

6. Are there existing MoAs for PR between the U.S and other countries or within the interagency construct?

A: Not aware of any; however, access denial is generally not a problem in theater (except for North Korea). Cooperative agreements are handled through diplomatic channels. (?) Concur. With the exception of the DPRK, my belief is that we (the USG) will be able to execute a PR mission with the assistance/permission of the host government.

7. What do you wish you had now which could improve your chances of a successful recovery in the future?

A: I didn't really ask you this one, but if you have anything to add, please feel free to inject it. More money. I'm not being flippant here. If money is not an issue, I could preposition assets at key locations in theater and would be ready for any contingency. Since money and resources are an issue, I believe that I am in a position where I will simply react to the situation and go from there.

APPENDIX II

Transcript: Jerald F. Ogrisseg, Director, Joint Personnel Recovery Center,
USPACOM, e-mail message to author, 28 February 2011.

David,

There wasn't an attachment. My responses are below. Hope this helps, and good luck!

Cheers,

Doc O.

-----Original Message-----

From: David Barr [mailto:fubarr87@gmail.com]

Sent: Friday, February 25, 2011 9:33
To: Ogrisseg, Jerald F CIV PACOM, J35
Subject: LCDR Barr concerning PR in PACOM AOR

Mr. Ogrisseg,

Thanks again for your time on the phone and the information you provided. As discussed per our phone conversation, below you will find my specific questions which, if answered, would go a long way toward helping me with my project. Thanks again!

1. Is there a dedicated intelligence analysis cell for PR at PACOM/JICPAC? If not, how is intelligence support to PR handled? By whom? In what form?

NO. The intell support we've received so far has been by our request, coming in the form of prepping PMESII briefings for specific plan reviews and updates. We've had help from our SJFHQ, our plans directorate, and we also request assistance from JPRA.

2. Is hostage-taking a concern in the PACOM AOR? If so, in what particular geographic area(s)? By what group(s)?

YES. Concerns are in the regions of south Asia and southeast Asia. The main "groups" we're concerned about are Abu Sayyaf, Jama'ah Islamiyah, Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid, MILF, LET, and Dawood Ibrahim Group. There are transnational threats within these regions, some of which are al Qaeda related, others are politically or ideologically motivated, and some criminal groups that peddle guns and drugs. Of course, you have some groups that cross all those boundaries to support their primary aims. There is a significant human trafficking risk in much of the region. Obviously not all of these factors involve risks to hostage taking of DoD members.

3. As JPRC Director, what would you consider your worst-case scenario? Describe a scenario which keeps you up at night.

I need to clarify your question. I'm not really the JPRC Director per se, but have overall responsibility for managing PR operations within the theater. As far as worst case scenario, we have a lot of people stationed and helping others within the AOR. There are a lot of countries and a lot of water. I worry about anyone sent forward who hasn't planned, prepared, and equipped their folks to report themselves as isolated or missing and to provide a location as soon as possible to set the PR process in motion.

4. How do you deal with the geographic scale of the AOR? Are there regional PRDs scattered throughout the AOR or is everything handled from Hawaii? Upon which service branches and assets do you rely for PR?

We do not have regional PRDs, but we have JPRCs and PRCCs in countries where we have a larger DoD presence, or can stand them up as necessary in accordance with PACOM plans and taskings. A regional PRCC/JPRC would not work for normal peacetime operations due to lack of authorities to launch rescue efforts in other sovereign countries. Who we rely on for PR depends on the plan and where we have forces, so any service and SOF forces can have primary responsibility for PR within an AOR.

5. In the case of a hostage-taking scenario, how dependent are you/would you be on interagency cooperation? FBI, CIA, DoS, etc.? How is that coordinated?

In the case of a hostage-taking scenario, we're largely dependent on interagency cooperation. We coordinate that through our DoS/DSS liaison here at the HQ. This also occurs at the country team level in other sovereign territory. Of course, due to the amount of water and coastlines in the AOR, we rely on our Coast Guard liaisons as well.

6. Are there existing Memorandums of Agreement (MoA) for PR between the U.S and other countries for access in a PR event? How are cooperative agreements between the U.S. and other countries handled?

There are agreements that cover PR events, but may not name them as "PR". For example, the FBI works with other countries to investigate "hostage taking", which is a type of PR event. The Coast Guard works with other countries to perform Search and Rescue under IAMSAR. Any arrangements made have to be worked with partner nation governments through DOS and the embassies. It's probably best to work with these departments to understand how international agreements are handled.

7. What/who do you wish you had now which could improve your chances of a successful recovery in the future?

We need more staff at the OPR shop, at the JPRC, and dedicated intell assistance. With these, I'd have more time and resources to liaison and network with interagency personnel with connections at the country team level.

APPENDIX III

Transcript: Patrick W. Wiegleb. Director, Consolidated Personnel Recovery Center
Afghanistan, e-mail message to author, 07 March 2011.

David,

First of all, let me warn you that this is a long email, I got a bit carried away writing it. Hope it can help you out a bit. I'm the director of Consolidated Personnel Recovery Center Afghanistan, which combines the US Forces Afghanistan PRCC with the ISAF Combat Rescue Coordination Center under one roof. We (at least our USFOR-A side) fall under the CENTCOM JPRC at Al Udeid, as you mentioned. The way we operate here is that we supervise and coordinate the Rescue Coordination Centers in each of the six ISAF Regional Commands. During PR events, we are the link between the RCs and JPRC, giving the battlespace owner access to any national or theater assets they need in order to action the event. We also have a close liaison with the US Embassy, SOF, and the intelligence community. During 2010 we had 30 CENTCOM PR events in Afghanistan and recovered 150 isolated personnel alive and 68 dead.

We definitely consider PR to include kidnap/hostage situations in addition to traditional CSAR. In fact, one problem I see in the PR community is that many of the community leaders and doctrine-writers have a Vietnam/Cold War Air Force mindset. This includes younger people too, since the culture of Air Force PR is centered around CSAR and the ERQS/Guardian Angel platform. Here in Afghanistan, and I imagine in PACOM as well, a targeted kidnapping is a more significant threat than an aircraft or conventional force-related event. What we have seen is that when a helicopter is brought down by mechanical failure or enemy action, the people on the ground are very quickly secured by the forces traveling with them, often even before the event is reported. Additionally, the anti-air threat here is relatively low, especially to fixed-wing aircraft. Basically, this is the story of the success of CSAR and our pre-planned responses - traditional isolated personnel are generally rescued in minimal time by their own unit/component.

Kidnapping are a completely different concern. We currently have four open cases involving five isolated personnel, all of them kidnap/captures. Once we know a person is under hostile control, the architecture transitions from ops-centric to intel-centric as we attempt to find and fix the target. We have an intelligence support to PR cell here at ISAF Joint Command consisting of an Army major and an analyst. They track all the reporting on the open events as well as I&W. Our goal is for them to also identify networks and TTPs so that we can do better analysis of where a hostage might be moved after capture. Additionally, we have a CENTCOM analyst who is assigned here strictly to work on the SPC Bergdahl case but who helps us out during active events as able. During crises, they are very valuable by linking us to the national intelligence services as well as the Regional Command J2 organizations. This helps in fusing all the information out there so that useful intelligence gets

passed to the ops side of the house. CENTCOM JAT-PR provides helpful information and our analysts and I communicate with them regularly. So I would say that having an intel analysis/fusion capability specifically dedicated to PR is very helpful at the CENTCOM level and at our level in Afghanistan. If I could wave a magic wand, my cell would include not only analysts but also a collection manager with HUMINT experience. Solid liaison and a good relationship with OGA is another very helpful thing to have.

With that, I'll give you my comments on your questions. I'll answer from my CENTCOM perspective and speculate on how I would look at it in PACOM, where I have spent most of my time in the Navy (3 years in Hawaii and 5 in San Diego), including my introduction to PR - I was in the Philippines when the Burnhams got rolled up and also participated in searching for a LTJG who was isolated and thought to be captured near Mt Pinatubo.

1. Is there a dedicated intelligence analysis cell for PR at PACOM/JIOCPAC? If not, how is intelligence support to PR handled? By whom? In what form?
-CENTCOM has a robust Intel Support to PR cell that you are familiar with in JAT-PR. Additionally, here in Afghanistan we have a small PR intel det backed up by good relationships with the various agencies operating in country.

2. Is hostage-taking a concern in the PACOM AOR? Where? By whom?
- Hostage taking is a major concern throughout Afghanistan. Kidnapping are conducted by various Taliban factions, the Haqqani network, and lower-level criminal enterprises for a mix of political and profit motives. Targets range from Local Nationals (including Afghan government officials) to NGO workers, diplomats, ISAF military and even tourists. Criminal kidnappers may look to quickly sell their hostages to a more capable captor, especially if the victim is not an Afghan.
Movement of the hostage into neighboring countries is a significant challenge for us because of cross-border authorities; the find/fix phase becomes complicated because of interagency relationships and the need for host nation cooperation.

If I were a PR officer in PACOM I would be concerned about hostage-taking as one of my top priorities. There are no active combat operations but there is a relatively heavy US footprint in the region, creating a target-rich environment for anyone wanting to kidnap PACOM personnel. I may be mirror-imaging my AO, but the business model of kidnapping a soft target in a location such as a liberty port and then quickly moving the victim to a denied area would seem to have potential for success. For example, if I were a kidnapper I could roll up an American in someplace like Kuala Lumpur, Phuket, Sattahip, or even (less likely) Singapore or Darwin and very quickly have him on a boat moving him to Indonesia or the Southern Philippines where finding and fixing the target would become much more difficult. It's not a sanctuary area to the same degree as the FATA but it would still present challenges.

3. What would you consider a worst-case scenario for PR in the PACOM AOR?

- Here in Afghanistan, our worst-case scenario would be another Bergdahl scenario - the capture and detention of a US soldier. This could result from a surface to air engagement or from a straight-up kidnapping. Another bad scenario would be kidnappings of Embassy personnel due to the effects that increased FP measures could have on US diplomacy.

If I put my PACOM hat on, I think the worst case scenario is the one I described above, especially if it involved multiple and/or high profile hostages. Kidnapping of a high-profile individual (doesn't even have to be high-profile before the event, look at Jessica Lynch as an example) is an ideal way to achieve strategic effects through a tactical action.

4. How do you deal with the scale of the geographic area?

- This would be a problem in PACOM, but it's mitigated by the fact that most of it is open water, where people don't tend to get kidnapped. I think I would worry most about rural areas in developing countries and urban areas where Americans are known to be. Kidnap of a target of opportunity in PACOM is less likely than in Afghanistan, I would be more concerned with a planned and targeted event. Moving the hostage will be a challenging task for the kidnapper, who will have to rely on his boat blending in with all the other maritime traffic. Vehicle traffic is more common in the PACOM AOR than in Afghanistan, but host nation security services are also more capable. Crossing most borders on land would be more difficult in PACOM. If you assume that hostages will not be moved by air, the potential size of the area the hostage can be moved around in is fairly similar in any developing country. If you can quickly establish a datum and coordinate with local security forces you may be able to shut down the MSRs leading out of the capture area and keep the target contained. This is why fast reporting is absolutely essential regardless of AOR.

5. How do you scope the mission? Who are you responsible for?

- Can't answer for PACOM. For USFOR-A, our unclassified definition of Isolated Personnel is: "USCENTCOM, USFOR-A, and ISAF military, government civilians, military contractor personnel, or designated persons of interest who have become separated from their unit or organization in a potentially hostile environment requiring them to survive, evade, resist, or escape". People falling outside this definition can be declared to be Persons Of Interest by COMISAF at the request of the isolated person's Embassy. Our definition is fairly broad and includes all US and coalition military. The term "government civilians" is intended to cover Chief of Mission (embassy) personnel and not just DoD civilians. The reason why we define it so broadly is in order to save time that would otherwise have to be spent getting a POI declaration that would be inevitably granted for an Embassy person. Note that local nationals are not covered in the definition, this is a host nation responsibility that we will assist with if requested. On the preemptive/proactive side, we are only responsible for training and equipping DoD people. It is a national or agency responsibility to ensure that people are properly prepared to operate here. This causes

problems when we have combined teams and the other countries' nationals want to be issued US equipment.

6. How dependent are you/would you be on interagency cooperation? FBI, CIA, DoS, etc.?

- In Afghanistan the military has the lion's share of the assets used for PR, so the other agencies rely heavily on us for PR capability. That said, we are very interoperable with the three agencies you specifically mention. We see them as a source of information as well as a source of potential isolated personnel that we might have to help, so we stay in close touch with them. Additionally, they have teams all over the country, so they are a potential recovery force, especially in the first few minutes of isolation when the scene is still permissive. Whenever an incident takes place we notify the Regional Security Officer and the FBI for SA and so they can identify whether they have a team in the area. If I can get an isolated person picked up by a USAID vehicle that just happens to be nearby, you better believe I'm going to do that if it's the fastest option.

In PACOM I'd be relying very heavily on those interagency capabilities, but in a different way. In most PACOM countries, we would be working through the host nation to effect recovery, since we don't have the same military freedom of action or authorities there that we have in Afghanistan. It would be closer to the way CENTCOM handles non-apportioned battlespace. Most of our intelligence information and possibly contacts to the captors would come from other agencies. It would be good for the intel support to PR cell in PACOM to be tied closely enough to the other services and to the CFSOCC to have some awareness of the HUMINT and NAR/UAR capabilities that exist before they are needed.

7. Are there existing Memorandums of Agreement (MoA) or Visiting Forces Agreements (VFA) for PR between the U.S. and other countries or within the interagency construct?

- We have an MOA in work with the US Embassy. Additionally, in our case the ISAF treaty and directives form the basis of our authorities to work with other countries. There is an overarching DoD/DoS MOA in staffing in DC right now, but a country-by-country or regional MOA between PACOM and State would be helpful. If I could wave a magic wand, every country's SOFA would address PR authorities and responsibilities, just so they are clear.

8. What resources/personnel/products do you wish you had now which you believe could improve your chances of a successful recovery in the future?

- We are resourced fairly well here, but that's because we are actively engaged in combat. Even so, we have a hard time getting the CJ2 to assign people to full-time PR duties. That would be even harder in a theater without combat operations going on. The likelihood of a PR event in PACOM is low enough that commanders may be reluctant to devote full-time effort to the mission. Having people who are PR-experienced in other theaters would be helpful, and getting people trained in PR301 at

PRETC is very significant. If you can't have a full-time PR cell you want to have a core of PR-trained people who are willing to devote themselves to the mission.

Well, I hope that some of this excessively long email is helpful. If you don't mind, I'd like to read your paper when you're done with it. PR, and specifically kidnapping and hostage-taking have become a pretty strong interest for me and I'd be very curious to see what you learn about how it all works in PACOM. Please let me know if you have any follow on questions or if there's anything else I can do for you. Enjoy the War College, it's a great experience.

Regards,
Pat

APPENDIX IV

Transcript: Patrick W. Wieglob. Director, Consolidated Personnel Recovery Center
Afghanistan, e-mail message to author, 12 March 2011.

David,

No problem, like you said, the PR world gets under your skin. It's tough to stay in the game in the Navy, our service is not big on building a base of experience.

I definitely think each COCOM should have a dedicated PR intel team. Granted, the likelihood might be low, but the strategic effects of a hostage taking are potentially very high. People (including me when I first got here) sometimes say, "what will those people do when there's not an event going on?" What they can do between active events is study historic events, learn kidnapping networks and TTPs, identify likely kidnap/hostage facilitators, help with establishing NAR, build liaison with other services, etc. There's no shortage of work for the cell. That goes for whether there is a war on or not - the DAO in the Philippines could get kidnapped tomorrow.

Pat